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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED*: DOES GOOGLE'S
"IMAGE SEARCH" INFRINGE VESTED
EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER
THE COPYRIGHT LAW?
EUGENE GORYUNOV **

The copyright system has become the most extensive regulator "of
speech and culture... [and] will help determine
the richness and
1
strength of democracy in the twenty-first century."

* The phrase "All Rights Reserved" is derived as a "statement that
indicates the reservation of property right[s]" under the copyright notice
requirement established in the Buenos Aires Convention.
Buenos Aires
Convention, art. 3, Aug. 11, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, T.S. 593 [hereinafter BAC].
The BAC became obsolete when Nicaragua became the last signatory of the
BAC to join the Berne Convention on August 23, 2000. Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berne Notification No. 218:
Accession by the Republic of Nicaragua, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION (WIPO), May 23, 2000, http://www.wipo.int/edocs/notdocs/en/
berne/treaty-berne_218.html; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 38A:
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 2003,
available at httpJ/www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38a.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2008) (listing signatory countries and date of accession to the BAC, the Berne
Convention, and other Intellectual Property treaties). Contrary to the BAC,
the Berne Convention requires copyright protection to be granted in all
signatory countries automatically without requirement of notice.
Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 17
U.S.C. 104, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter BC]; see infra note 40 and
accompanying text (discussing amendments to the BC removing the notice
requirement).
Even though "All Rights Reserved" has no modern legal
significance, it is still used to disclaim a warning that "the author realizes he
has a copyright and he really means to keep it." Arnoud Engelfriet, The
Phrase "All rights reserved", Ius MENTIS: LAW AND TECHNOLOGY EXPLAINED,
May 25, 2006, http'/www.iusmentis.com/copyright/allrightsreserved (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008).
** Juris Doctor Candidate 2008, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago,
Illinois.
1. Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyright Jungle, 45 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.
42 (Oct. 2006).
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INTRODUCTION

Search engines such as Google.com provide a tremendous
public benefit2 by enhancing, improving, and mainstreaming
information-gathering techniques on the Internet.' After the dotcom bubble burst in 2001, 4 Google claimed a domineering position
in the marketplace,' securing its niche as "the nexus of human
curiosity."
Google's corporate mission to make the world's
information more accessible and more useful7 is revealing of its
vast influence in today's world. Google provides an ever-improving
search technology8 that is capable of scouring billions of web sites,9
news articles,"9 literary works," images, and videos 2 in the

2. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002), af/d in part,
rev'd in part, 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
3. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 851 (D. Cal. 2006), affd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d
701 (9th Cir. 2007).
4. Robert F. Reilly, et al., Value & Cents: Update on Study of Discount for
Lack of Marketability, 24-5 ABIJ 42, 46 (2005); Howard Kurtz, Who Blew the
Dot-Com Bubble?; The Cautionary Tale of Henry Blodget, WASH. POST, Mar.
12, 2001, at C1. Lasting from approximately 1997 to 2001, stock markets saw
rapid growth in Internet companies based on speculative earning projections.
Id. This period, known as the "dot-com bubble," saw the founding of many
Internet-based companies, fueled mainly by the rapid increase in stock prices,
widely available venture capital funding, and excessive developer confidence.
Id.
5. See Stefanie Olsen, The Google Gods, CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 31, 2002,
http://news.com.com/2009-1023-963618.html (explaining that after the dot-com
bubble burst, Google "not only survived but reigns supreme" in the
marketplace).
6. Thomas Claburn, Google Revealed: An Inside Look At How Its 'Out
Loud' Culture Translates into Technical Advantage, INFORMATIONWEEK, Aug.
28, 2006, at 35.
7. See
Google
Corporate
Information:
Company
Overview,
http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008)
(stating that Google's mission statement is to "organize the world's
information and make it universally accessible and useful").
8. See Claburn, supra note 6, at 40 (explaining that Google invests roughly
fifty percent of its capital expenditures in developing its information
technology infrastructure and exploring and developing new search technology
and services).
9. See Gulli & Signorini, infra note 13 and accompanying texts.
10. See Google opens up 200 years of news, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk2/hi/business/5317942.stm
(describing Google's new
search technology which allows used to explore "existing digitised [sic]
newspaper articles spanning the last 200 years.") The new service will allow
users to search hundreds of free and charged-for news sources. Id. The
service also allows the user to view articles from a "timeline" so as to allow a
"historical overview" of "key time periods." Id. Anurag Acharya, Google
engineer, has explained that the earliest searchable story is from "somewhere
in the mid-1700s." Id.
11. See Google Book Search: Program Basics, http://books.google.com
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"Indexable Web." 3 Google features not only search functionality,
but also several Internet-based services that have further
solidified its online empire."
Recently, different aspects of Google's search technology and
services have come under fire in a series of lawsuits, alleging
contributory, vicarious, and direct copyright infringement. 5 If
/googlebooks/about.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (explaining that the
benefit of the new search functionality is to provide users the opportunity to
explore books that match their search criteria). The service also offers users
access to browse and print the full text of "older works out of copyright." See
Vaidhyanathan, supra note 1 (discussing the functionality of Google's Book
Search). Vaidhyanathan quoted Kevin Kelly, executive editor of Wired
Magazine, to propose that the eventuality of Google's plan to scan millions of
books is that (1) works with "marginal" popularity will find greater public
exposure, (2) the "universal library" will increase our grasp of history, and (3)
such library of all books will "cultivate a new sense of authority." Id.
12. See Google's Empire, infra note 14 (explaining that Google Video is the
answer to Apple's video download service through iTunes). As a part of the
service, Google has an agreement with CBS to offer for purchase "blockbuster
hits, such as CSI and Survivor." Id.
13. See A. Gulli & A. Signorini, The Indexable Web Is More Than 11.5
Billion Pages, May 2005, http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/-asignori/web-size/sizeindexable-web.pdf (describing Internet population calculation model and
estimating that as of the end of January 2005 the size of the publicly
indexable Internet is at least 11.5 billion pages); see also Brief of Amicus
Curiae by the Electric Frontier Foundation, American Library Association,
Medical Library Association, American Association of Law Libraries,
Association of Research Libraries, and Special Libraries Association in
Support of Google, Inc. at 23, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-55405 (9th
Cir. Jul. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Google's Amicus Curiae Brief] (stating that in
2005, Yahoo!, Inc. estimated that the internet contained over nineteen billion
web documento and 1.6 billion images (internal citation omitted)).
14. See Alfred Hermida, Google's Online Empire, BBC NEWS, Jul. 3, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/5132806.stm
[hereinafter
"Google's
Empire"] (describing Google's "portfolio of services"). The provided services
include Google Earth and Google Maps, which combine "satellite imagery and
maps" allowing users to graphically view and get directions to anywhere on
the planet. Id. Gmail, Google's free email suite that comes complete with
calendar, contacts, chat, and spreadsheet functionality is also provided in the
services. About Gmail, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/intl/en/about.html.
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008). Google also provides users with a desktop-based
utility "Google Toolbar" which integrates into the user's web browser and
provides "enhanced" searching, language "translation," "pop-up blocker," quick
access to "Gmail," and many other customization features. Google Toolbar
Help, Toolbar Features, http://www.google.com/support/toolbar/bin/static.py?
page=features.html&hl=en&v=4 (last visted Feb. 12, 2008).
15. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816 (demanding a motion for preliminary injunction
based on allegations of copyright infringements arising out of Google's image
search); Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (requesting a motion for
preliminary injunction based on allegations of vicarious, contributory, and
direct copyright infi-ingement arising out of Google's Image Search); Field v.
Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1110 (D. Nev. 2006) (alleging damages
resulting from Google's automatic caching functionality); Agence France
Presse (AFP) v. Google Inc., No. 05-00546 (D.C. Mar. 17, 2005) (demanding a
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handled without foresight, these lawsuits have the potential to
have a "seismic impact upon the operation of search engines and,
therefore, the utility of the Internet itself."1"
This Comment will explore and seek to derive a balance
between public interest in the disclosure of a creative work and a
copyright owner's exclusive rights granted under copyright law.
Part I provides a brief overview of the purpose, history, and
evolution of the American copyright system. Part II describes the
technology involved in Google's "Image Search" and its
functionality. Parts III and IV engage in an analysis of copyright
infringement jurisprudence as it applies to Google's use of
thumbnail copies of full-sized images as a part of its Image Search
technology.
Part V argues that, in light of copyright
jurisprudence, Google's use of thumbnail images in its Image
Search is fair and noninfringing.
In order to preserve the
usefulness of the Internet, this Comment proposes that courts
recognize an interpretation of copyright jurisprudence that will
promote easy access to information, while preserving copyright
protections.
I.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS

A. BriefHistory and Purpose of the Modern
American Copyright Law
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution grants
Congress the power to legislate copyright and patent laws to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 7 This exclusive right,
however, is not a natural right, but rather a "Right" bestowed to
the holder of the copyright or patent as a course of law. Thomas
Jefferson, author of the Patent Act of 1790, explained that the
Constitution did not recognize natural property rights of the
author inherent in his intellectual product; 8 rather, Jefferson
motion for preliminary injunction based on allegations of copyright
infringements arising out of Google's news headline aggregation).
16. Peter J. Pizzi, Perfect 10 v. Google: Adult Web Site Challenges Search
Engine on Image Hits, Jan. 2005, http://www.cfg-lawfirm.com/articles/pizzigoogle-plO.pdf.
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
18. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (citing a letter
written by Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 1813)). Justice Clark
explained that Thomas Jefferson rejected the natural-rights theory in

intellectual property and recognized that the constitutional grant to Congress
of the power to create a patent and copyright monopoly was not intended to
secure natural rights in property to the invention or creative work, but to
reward and induce the disclosure of new knowledge. The letter, in pertinent
part stated, "[ilnventions ...

cannot, in nature, be subject of property. Society
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appreciated that the Constitution permitted Congress to grant
property rights, by means of a limited monopoly, to the author as a
reward for his creative time and effort.19 This economic incentive0
underlying the copyright law2 ' is deemed to encourage the
inventive spirit. Personal financial gain 2 serves as the most
viable manner in which to foster creative artistic expression for
the public good.22 Thus, with the public good being the primary
concern, the limited monopoly granted to authors and inventors is
just a "secondary consideration." 24
Although federal copyright law originated with the passage of
the U.S. Constitution, prior to its ratification, twelve of the
thirteen original colonies had enacted some form of copyright
laws. 5 The First Congress exercised its constitutional power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"2 6 by enacting the
first federal copyright act, the Copyright Act of 1790.27 The
purpose of the Copyright Act of 1790 was to encourage learning by
granting authors the exclusive right to print, publish, and sell
copies of their work for a term of fourteen years with the right to

may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility." Id. (citing
VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 180-81 (Washington ed.)).
19. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
20. See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 23
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. ed. 4 2005) (1943) [hereinafter LEAFFER]
(discussing that an author "who cannot recoup his investment will not
create"). But see Vaidhyanathan, supra note 1 (explaining the copyright
download paradox that "sometimes free stuff sells stuff."). By analogy, if every
copyright infringement replaced a sale of the creative work, no commercial
industry would survive. Id.
21. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
1-1 §1.03[A] (Mark Wasserman et al. eds., Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. rev. 70
2006)(1963) [hereinafter NIMMER] (explaining that "[t]he primary purpose of
copyright is not to reward the author, but is rather to secure the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of the author").
The
encouragement of intellectual works, by way of "economic incentives granted
to authors and inventors" is a means to an end. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981) rev'd 464 U.S. 417 (1984); see
also Vaidhyanathan, supra note 1 (noting that for most of its history, the
copyright law has successfully protected the "integrity of creative works" while
creating a foundation for future creators to "build on the cultural foundation
around them").
22. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (expressing that
"encouragement of individual efforts by personal gain" is the means to
achieving the end of continued creative contributions).
23. Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156.
24. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
25. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 649 (1943).
Delaware was the only colony that did not adopt a copyright statute. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (superseded by the Copyright
Act of 1909).
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renew once for an additional fourteen years.28 The next major
copyright reform 9 occurred with the Copyright Act of 1909,30 which
added additional exclusive rights,31 increased the scope of
copyrightable subject matter,32 added the requirement of notice of
copyright, and extended the copyright term from fourteen to
twenty-eight years, with the right to renew once for another
twenty-eight years. 3 The last major revision to the copyright law
took place with the Copyright Act of 1976. 34 Under the Act of 1976,
authors, as the original owners of the copyright, 35 are granted a
bundle of exclusive rights 38 over all creative works created and
28. Id.; see John Presper, Copyright Restoration under § 104A: Rethinking
Copyright Law's FirstAmendment Immunity, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 431, 433-34
(2002) (explaining that the Act was signed into law by George Washington on
May 31, 1790 and published throughout the country shortly thereafter). A
majority of the Act was borrowed from the 1710 Statute of Anne - the first
copyright law in the United Kingdom enacted during the reign of Queen Anne.
Id. The Act, however, did not extend copyright protection to foreign authors,
and allowed U.S. publishers to "pirate" international works. LEAFFER, supra
note 20, at 7.
29. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 7 (explaining that, "in December 1905,
President Theodore Roosevelt called for a complete revision of the copyright
law to meet modem conditions.").
30. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)
(replaced by the Copyright Act of 1976).
31. The Act of 1909 expanded the copyright subject matter to include "all
the writings of an author." 35 Stat. 1075 at 1076; see LEAFFER, supra note 20,
at 8 (discussing new features of the Act of 1909).
32. With the addition of new categories of copyrightable materials, such as
drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical nature, 35 Stat. 1075 at
1077, Congress tried to develop an Act that would maintain the balance
between an owner's exclusive rights and public interest in disclosure of the
creative work. LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 8. The House of Representatives
Report explains that:
The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection
accorded to music has been to give the composer an adequate return for
the value of his composition, and it has been a serious and difficult task
to combine the protection of the composer with the protection of the
public, and to so frame an act that it would accomplish the double
purpose for securing to the composer an adequate return for all use
made of his composition and at the same time prevent the formation of
oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon the very rights
granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting his interests.
H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
33. Pub. L. No. 60-349 (1909).
34. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (explaining that copyright in any work that falls
within the subject matter of the Act is initially vested in the "author or
authors of the work"). However, if the work in question was made for hire, the
employer for whom the work was prepared "is considered the author," for
purposes of the Act. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). The Act defines "work for hire" as a
"work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment."
17 U.S.C. § 101(1).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The author was given exclusive rights to do and to
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embodied in any tangible medium.37 Additionally, the Act of 1976
provides automatic protection for all new works in all new media
formats "now known or later developed,"" codifies the "fair use"
exception,39 and clarifies conflicts in judicial statutory
interpretation. °
B. FairUse Exception
Prior to the Act of 1976, courts developed an equitable "fair
use" defense that excluded certain secondary uses of an original
work from liability for copyright infringement. 41 Adopting the view
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to
display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.

Id.
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (stating that copyright protection is extended
to all creative works "fixed in any tangible medium of expression").
38. Id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
40. The Act of 1976 does not extend copyright protection to "any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The Act also
brought an end to the renewal provision by adopting a single copyright term
that lasts for the duration of the author's life plus 70 years. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a). The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Oct. 31, 1988,
102 Stat. 2853, amended the Act of 1976, making notice of copyright optional
rather than mandatory. This amendment resulted from the entry of the
United States into the BC, ending American isolation from the mainstream of
world copyright law.
41. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)
(holding that in determining the availability of the fair use defense, the court
must "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the
sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work").
The term "fair use" was first used twenty-eight years later in Lawrence v.
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 58 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136). The fair use doctrine
applies as a limit to the copyright protections of intellectual property, but it
has never been applied to tangible property. In fact, the most important
"difference between intellectual property and other forms of property is the
fair use defense." Dana S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral
Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 56 (1997). Judge Leval of
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held by a majority of circuits, Congress codified the Fair Use
Doctrine, which provides that the use of a copyrighted work for
purposes such as "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright."42 This doctrine was
created to allow courts to avoid the rigid application of the
copyright statute when it would interfere with the encouragement
of artistic creativity.43 Because the original doctrine was developed
as an equitable measure," Section 107 of the copyright statute
does not attempt to define fair use. Instead, Section 107 provides
four factors that courts should consider in determining whether
the secondary use made of a copyrighted work in any particular
case is a fair use within the language, purpose, and intent of the
statute. 4 These factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the6 use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.1
These fair use factors, while strictly enumerate in the statute,
merely serve as illustrations of what should be considered by the
court in making a fair use determination. The factors are not
express limitations on the relevant circumstances that may be
considered 7 and provide only general guidelines as to what kinds
of uses were likely envisioned by Congress as being fair.'
Nor

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has
explained that the fair use doctrine is not a "bizarre, occasionally tolerated
departure" from general property law, but that it is a "necessary part" of the
overall design of the copyright monopoly. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1990).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
43. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (explaining
that the fair use defense was intended to prevent "stifl[ing] the very creativity
which th[e] [copyright] law is designed to foster.")
44. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 65-66 (1976) (explaining that due to the
equitable nature of the doctrine, "no generally applicable definition is
possible"); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (explaining that the fair use
analysis always "calls for a case-by-case" analysis).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
46. Id.
47. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 §13.05[A][l][a n.44 (explaining
that Section 107 provides a list of factors that "will tend to render a use 'fair,'"
but this list is "not an exhaustive enumeration").
48. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
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does Section 107 apportion any weight to any of the fair use
factors,49 leaving such determination to the discretion of the
In applying the fair use
courts 50 on a case-by-case basis.515
exception, courts must consider the ultimate purpose of the
copyright law and determine if such purpose would be better
furthered by allowing the secondary use in question, rather than
restricting it."
II.

GOOGLE'S IMAGE SEARCH TECHNOLOGY

To appreciate the legal issues stemming from Google's Image
Search technology, one must gain a basic understanding of the
technologies and their functionality in a typical Internet search.
An Internet search engine is comprised of three major components:
(1) a "spider" that crawls the web to create a catalogue of full text
documents; (2) the catalogue that, in turn, becomes a searchable
"index" containing information collected by the spider; and (3) an
"index-searching software" that searches the index based on the
user requests.53
An "image search" engine, like a text search engine, uses the
However,
spider/index/index-searching software combination.
rather than creating a catalogue of text, the spider creates a
catalogue of "thumbnails,"' corresponding to full-sized images
The catalogue is indexed by the filename
found on the web.
associated with the image. The index-searching software returns
a page of thumbnails that match the user's input.56
49. Sony, 464 U.S. at 476 (Blackmum, J., dissenting).
50. NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A] at n.32.
51. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. Fair use jurisprudence can be stated
generally in the Golden Rule: "Take not from others to such an extent and in
such a manner that you would be resentful if they so took from you." NIMMER,
supra note 21, at 4-13 §13.05[A] (quoting McDonald, Non-infringing Uses, 9
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc. 466, 468 (1962)).
52. See Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d
Cir. 1998) (explaining that in applying the fair use test, courts should inquire
into whether the purpose of the copyright law "would be better served by
allowing [a certain] use than by preventing it").
Initial
Interest Confusion: Brookfield
N.
King,
53. Shannon
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 313, 315 (2000).
54. See infra Part II.C (describing what constitutes a thumbnail and how is
it used in the context of an image search engine).
55. Id.; see also Ditto.com, Copyright, http://www.ditto.com/copyright.aspx
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Ditto.com Copyrights] (describing the
necessity of thumbnails and the basic functionality of the "visual search
mechanism"). Image search technology can be more useful than a regular
textual search. Id. Ditto.com acknowledges that many of the images are
protected by copyrights and that by locating and displaying the images,
Ditto.com "does not hold, grant or imply any license to use these pictures for
any purpose other than viewing them on the web." Id.
56. Supra Part II.
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For example, when the user searches for pictures of the "Eiffel
Tower," the index-searching software will create a result page of
"cached" thumbnails. These thumbnails represent images located
on the Internet with filenames that contain the exact words or
similar words or phrases to those entered by the user. Clicking on
any thumbnail takes the user to a new. split-frame page where the
top portion contains Google's logo, thumbnail, information about
the picture,57 a statement that the image may be subject to
copyright,"8 and a link to the original web site that contains the
original full-size image represented by the thumbnail. The bottom
portion of the split-frame page contains the framed original site, in
its entirety, by means of an inline link. This allows the user to
view the image in its original and intended context, as well as view
other information and images contained on the corresponding web
page. Clicking on the link to the original web site or the "Remove
Frame" link in the upper right hand corner closes the top frame
containing Google's information, leaving the original web site on
the screen.
A. System Caching
As Google's spider crawls through the web, it creates a
catalogue of all searchable material on the Internet. 9 This
catalogue is then stored as "system cache" 6 on Google's servers
located at its "server farms.""' The purpose of this cache is twofold.
First, it allows Google to provide a quick response to the user's
search query.62 Second, this cache serves as backup in case the
original page is unavailable for live viewing or has been removed
by the owner."
Google's system caching has recently been subject to
copyright litigation,64 but ultimately the court found that under
57. For example: Print and download size. Eg. 1200 x 1600 pixels - 675k.
58. See Google: Image Search Results, "Eiffel Tower," http://www .google.

com (last visited Feb. 12, 2008) (displaying the following copyright disclaimer:
"image may be scaled down and subject to copyright").
59. See supra Part II (discussing search engine technology).
60. Nancy Blachman & Jerry Peek, Google Guide: Cached Pages,
http://www.googleguide.com/cached-pages.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
61. Google has between 200,000 and 450,000 servers spread out over sixtyfive data centers. In declining to disclose the true number of servers, Google
explains that this information is considered to be its most strategic advantage
over the competition. However, another reason for this silence is attributed to

the fact that any quoted number is outdated at almost the very moment it is
cited. Claburn, supra note 6, at 36.

62. Id.
63. Google Help, Cached Links, http://www.google.com/help/features.html
(last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
64. See Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (describing that plaintiff alleged that
Google infringed his copyright to the contents of his personal web page by
making a copy of the web page into Google's cache).
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,65 Google's cache qualified
for the caching "safe harbor"6' reserved for online service
providers.67 The court also found that Google's use of "system
cache" is a fair use of copyrighted works.' The court noted that
Google's cache was transformative of the original copyrighted
material because it served a different purpose than that served by
the original.69 Under these circumstances, the court concluded
that Google's cache was not a replacement for the original, did not
function as its substitute," and was within the scope of the fair use
exception.
B.

Framingand In-Line Linking

Both framing and in-line linking allow the author to create
hybrid web pages that contain both local and remote third-party
content. Both methods differ from the use of a hyperlink. While a
hyperlink actually takes the user to the referenced web page,"
framing and in-line linking display remote information without
the user leaving the current page.
Framing is a method of subdividing the currently viewed page
into independent frames, with each displaying different local or
remote contents."
The framed remote content functions no
differently in the frame than it does on the original page.73 This
65. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 512 (2006).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (b)(1)(C); see 17 U.S.C. § 512 (b) (2006) (providing that a
service provider "shall not be liable for monetary relief.., or for injunctive or
equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of... storage of
material on a system... controlled or operated by or for the service provider"
when "the storage is carried out through an automatic technical process for
the purpose of making the material available to users of the system.").
67. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
68. Id. at 1118.
69. See id. at 1119 (noting that Google's cache enables users to access
content when the original page is inaccessible). Even assuming that the
plaintiffs original web page was intended to serve an "artistic purpose,"
Google's use of the cache was to "improve access to information on the
[Ilnternet." Id. at 1118.
70. Id. at 1118.
71. See Kara Beal, The Potential Liability of Linking on the Internet: An
Examination of Possible Legal Solutions, 1998 BYU L. REV. 703, 725 (1998)
(noting that hyperlinks are fundamental to the functionality of the Internet
and that "by publishing a site, the owner is impliedly licensing all hypertext
links"). The author notes that this implied license is not without limit and
that it is subject to fair use determinations. Id. at 726.
72. See Matthew Scherb, Free Content's Future: Advertising, Technology,
And Copyright, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1787, 1809 (2004) (analogizing framing to
"picture-in-picture on a television").
73. Matthew C. Staples, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 69, 72 (2003); see also LLOYD L. RICH, THE PUBLISHING LAW CENTER,
INTERNET LEGAL ISSUES: FRAMING, http://www.publaw.com/framing.html
(1999) (explaining that while the user is viewing content from multiple sources
at the same time, the "URL address contained in the user's browser continues
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allows the user to view a multitude of content "simultaneously"7 4
without ever leaving the current framing page.75
In-line linking also allows the author to integrate remote
content into his own page.7 ' However, in-line linking, unlike
framing, creates a seamless page,77 and the user is typically
unaware that the information being displayed on the current page
is being pulled from a remote page. 8 This process allows the
remote page to be "incorporated by reference," while its content
remains stored on another website without the use of frames. 9
C. Thumbnail Images
A thumbnail image is a smaller scale, lower resolution, digital
reproduction" of a full-size digital image."1 Google's Image Search
technology uses thumbnails as a means to link, organize, and
deliver corresponding full-sized images located on the Internet."'
The use of thumbnails is necessary and indispensable in
facilitating the internal and external visual search engine
mechanism" in locating and displaying images that match the

to display only the address of the framing page"). The benefit of framing
allows the authors to "capitalize on the design layout of their web site by
keeping advertising and certain web site material fixed within a particular
frame" without having that information interfere with any of the content
which the web site was designed to display. Id.
74. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d. at 833.
75. See supra Part II (providing an example of framing in the context of
searching for the "Eiffel Tower" on Google "Image Search"); see also Perfect 10,
416 F. Supp. 2d. at 833 (explaining that when the user clicks on a certain
"thumbnail returned as the result of a Google Image Search, his computer
pulls up a page comprised of two distinct frames, one hosted by Google and a
second hosted by the underlying website[.]" The court also explained that the
second frame contains the "original web page on which the original image was
found." Id. The court also clarified that Google "neither stores nor served any
of the content ...displayed in the lower frame." Id. at 834.
76. Scherb, supra note 72, at 1808.
77. See id. (discussing that the difference between framing and in-line
linking is that in-line linking "content is not boxed off but seamlessly and
indistinguishably integrated" into the page).
78. See Staples, supra note 73 (explaining that operators can prevent others
from in-line linking to their content "through simple programming
techniques").
79. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (citing Kelly, 336 F.3d at 816).
80. The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU), A PROPOSAL FOR EDUCATIONAL
FAIR USE GUIDELINES FOR DIGITAL IMAGES,

Section

1.4 (1996

draft),

httpJ/www.utsystem.eduogc/intellectualproperty/imagguid.htm.
81. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 833 n.4 (explaining that a thumbnail's
smaller size allows more images to "be displayed at the same time on a single
page or screen").
82. Staples, supra note 73, at 70.
83. See, e.g., http://www.ditto.com/copyright.aspx (explaining that visual
images create stark differences in comparing search results and are "an
improvement versus wading through cryptic text excerpts").
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user's query. By definition, a copy of the full-sized image needs to
be made to create the thumbnail. s4
Copyright lawsuits involving the creation and display of
thumbnails have reached conflicting results. These differences are
the focus of this Comment and will be discussed and reconciled in
Parts III and V.
III.

DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

Direct copyright infringement is expressly prohibited by the
Act of 1976."5 A prima facia case for direct liability requires a clear
showing (1) of ownership of a valid copyright,"6 and (2) a violation
of one of the exclusive rights 7 granted under copyright law.88 Even
if valid ownership has been established, inability to show a
violation of an exclusive right will preclude a finding of
infringement. The technology that serves as an integral part of a
visual search engine 9° directly implicates the right of public
display"1 - an expressly recognized exclusive right. 92
A.

In

Display and "In-Line Linking and Framing"

Kelly

v. Arriba Soft Corp.," the Ninth

Circuit was

confronted with an opportunity to settle the dispute of whether in-

line linking and framing 4 constitute copyright infringement." The

84. Staples, supra note 73, at 70-71.
85. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing that the "owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize" any reproduction of the
copyrighted work) (emphasis added).
86. LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 407. Ownership requires a showing of
"originality, copyrightable subject matter, compliance with statutory
formalities, and the necessary citizenship status." Id. Copyright registration
"constitutes primafacia evidence of ownership." Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 401(c)).
87. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
88. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)
(holding that the second element of direct copyright infringement is the
"copying of constituent elements" of the original work). But see LEAFFER,
supra note 20, at 408 (explaining that "copying is a term of art" and requires a
showing (1) that the defendant "actually copied the copyrighted work in
creating his own" and (2) that "defendant's copying amounted to an improper
appropriation).
89. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 407 (explaining that the exclusive rights
granted to a copyright owner "create the boundaries between an infringement
and an allowable use of a copyrighted work").
90. See supra Part II and accompanying text.
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "display" as the conduct of directly or
indirectly "show[ing] a copy of'the work).
92. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(5) (providing that the copyright owner has the
exclusive right to "display the copyrighted work publicly").
93. 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
94. See supra Part II.C (explaining that inline linking and framing allows
the user to incorporate content located on other web pages by reference); see
also notes 71-79 and accompanying texts (describing the differences between
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court held that using thumbnails of full-sized images constitutes
fair use, and reached this conclusion without entertaining a
discussion of whether in-line linking and framing are actionable as
a violation of copyright protection.96
Early in 2006, however, the District Court for the Central
District of California, in Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., addressed the
issue of in-line linking and framing directly. Judge Alvin Howard
Matz determined that there are at least two tests for defining
"display" for in-line linking and framing: the "server" test and the
"incorporation" test.9 Application of the "server" test results in a

in-line linking and framing).
95. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 817. The defendant, Arriba Soft, operated a visual
search engine, similar to the one operated by Google. Id. at 815. Arriba's
spider crawled the Internet, created thumbnails of images, and later used
these thumbnails to present search results back to the user. Id. Kelly, a
professional photographer, offered his photographs for sale through an
Internet website. After Arriba's spider indexed the page and created
thumbnails of Kelly's full-sized images, Kelly brought suit for copyright
infringement. Id. at 816. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found in favor of
Arriba, holding that the creation and display of thumbnails of Kelly's
copyrighted full-sized images for the purpose of indexing was a transformative
fair use. Id. at 822; see also Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based
Copyright Law: The Fairness And Morality Of French And American Law
Compared, 24 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 594-95 (2006) (arguing that the
Ninth Circuit decision in Kelly, applying the fair use defense to the creation
and display of thumbnail images, is in line with international copyright
practices). Piotraut explains that the French IP Code provides exceptions
from copyright violation for certain uses, unavailable under the American
copyright law, such as:
Complete or partial reproductions of works of graphic or threedimensional art intended to appear in the catalogue of a judicial sale
held in France, in the form of the copies of the said catalogue made
available to the public prior to the sale for the sole purpose of describing
the works of art offered for sale, as well as any acts necessary for the
accomplishment of a jurisdictional or administrative procedure provided
by law, or undertaken for public safety reasons.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
While the purpose and scope of fair use in America and France is quite
different, the jurisprudence of both countries leads to a "similar legal
conclusion." Id. at 595 n.360.
96. LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 373 n. 4 10.
97. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 828. There, P10 published an adult
magazine and operated a subscription-based adult website which featured
high-quality nude photographs of "natural" models. Id. at 831-32. Google's
spider indexed and created thumbnail images of full-sized images copyrighted
by P10 but located on third-party web pages that did not have permission from
P10 to display such images. Id. at 832-33. P10 sued for injunctive relief
alleging that Google was directly liable for creating and displaying thumbnails
of P10's copyrighted images. Id. The court found that Google's creation and
display of thumbnails of these images was not fair use, and granted the
injunction. Id. at 845. The author of this comment disputes the ultimate
holding of this case.
98. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
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finding that the "server where the original image resides is the one
that is 'displaying' the image."' On the other hand, application of
the "incorporation" test results in a finding that the host web page
that caused the image to be displayed is the one engaged in public
display.0 0 Because Judge Matz realized that "[t]o adopt the
incorporation test would cause a tremendous chilling effect on the
core functionality of the web,"1 1 he adopted the "server" test for
determining whether the lower frame in Google's Image Search
was "displaying" the images in question.1 2
B. Display and "Thumbnails"
When delivering the user's search results, the visual search
engine creates and displays thumbnails of full-sized copyright
images found on the Internet -implicating two exclusive rights
granted under the copyright statute.0 3 However, before concluding
that direct copyright infringement has occurred, the court must
determine if such secondary use is fair under the language of the
In doing
Act of 1976, and excluded from infringement liability.'

99. See id. at 839 (discussing that the server where the original image is
stored is the one "sending ones and zeroes over the internet to the user's
browser"). Under this test, a web page displays an image only if the image is
stored on the same server that is storing the web page in question. Id.
100. See id. (explaining that "display" under the "incorporation" test is the
"mere act of incorporating content into a web page that is then pulled by the
browser"). In effect, any page that incorporates material located on another
server via in-line linking or framing would be "displaying" the image opening
that page to potential copyright violations. Id.
101. See id. at 840 (opining that adopting the incorporation test for defining
"display" would adversely impact the Internet's "capacity to link, a vital
feature... that makes it accessible, creative, and valuable").
102. See id. at 843-44 (opining that the adoption of the test is in the best
interest of the Internet). Judge Matz based his adoption of the test on the
reasoning that 1) the "test is based on what happens at the technologicallevel ... and thus reflects the reality of how content actually travels over the
[I]nternet[;]" 2) the adoption of this test "neither invites" copyright
infringements nor "flatly precludes liability," but merely precludes a search
engine "from being held directly liable for in-line linking [and] framing
infringing content stored on third-party web pages[;]" 3) while both the
"server" and "incorporation" test can be easily understood and applied by
courts, the "incorporation" test "fails to acknowledge the interconnected nature
of the web, both in its physical and logical connections and in its ability to
aggregate and present content from multiple sources simultaneously[;]" and 4)
the "server" test maintains "the delicate balance for which copyright law
strives." Id.
103. See supra Part II and accompanying text for a discussion of how a
visual search engines technology operates.
104. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, (1976), as printed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see
also Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 141 (opining that "the ultimate test of fair use,
therefore, is whether the copyright law's goal of 'promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,' would be better served by allowing the use than by
preventing it." (internal citation omitted)). As Justice Story explained in
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so, the court must consider the very purpose of the copyright law'0 °
- "to promote the Progress of Science."1 °6 In fact, it has been
suggested that courts should recognize the constitutional purpose
of the copyright law as a fifth factor 1 7 in determining that tools
used for information gathering and locating favor a finding of fair
100

use.

1.

Purpose and Characterof Use

The first fair use factor involves an inquiry into whether the
secondary use of the copyrighted work is "commercial" in nature.'0 9
However, a finding that the secondary use is "commercial" does
not preclude"' a finding of fair use."' Instead, the would-be
Emerson v. Davies:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if
any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used
before. No man creates a new language for himself, at least if he be a
wise man, in writing a book. He contents himself with the use of
language already known and used and understood by others. No man
writes exclusively from his own thoughts, unaided and uninstructed by
the thoughts of others. The thoughts of every man are, more or less, a
combination of what other men have thought and expressed, although
they may be modified, exalted, or improved by his own genius or
reflection.
8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Ma. 1845).
105. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (acknowledging that "[firom the infancy
of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials
has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose").
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.
107. Sony, 464 U.S. at 448 n.31 (discussing that the fair use exception was
created as an "equitable rule of reason" and therefore "no generally applicable
definition is possible, and each case raising the question must be decided on
its own facts"). By recognizing the purpose and intent of the copyright system
"as a fifth relevant fair use factor," courts would be able to consider the policy
underlying the copyright law in determining whether a certain use is fair.
Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of
Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1771, 1840 (2006).
108. Oliar, supra note 107, at 1840. Associate Professor Oliar suggests that
such adoption would provide for a simpler application of the fair use factors
and allow courts to find fair use where progress of science would require it. Id.
He argues that considering policy and the progress of science would help
courts avoid manipulating the other fair use factors in finding that
"information location tools favor a fair use finding." Id.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). The statute expressly requires an inquiry into
whether the secondary "use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes." Id. Focus on the economic impact of the secondary use
"shows this factor's obvious connection with the fourth [statutory] factor."
LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 476.
110. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 476 (explaining that a finding that some
use was for a "commercial purpose will not conclusively negate a finding of fair
use").

20081

All Rights Reserved: Google's "Image Search"

infringer can swing the scales back in his favor by showing that
the secondary use is "transformative," as opposed to
"consumptive."
a.

Commercial Use

Courts have defined "commercial" use very broadly.1 3
Although commercial use tends to "cut against a fair use
defense,"1 4 the court may consider "whether the alleged infringing
use was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial
gain. ,, 15
b.

Productive/Transformative Use

The Supreme Court has explained that the central purpose of
the first fair use factor is to determine whether the secondary use
"merely 'supersede[s] the objects' of the original creation,... or
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message." 1 ' In effect, an inquiry under this factor asks "whether
and to what extent the new work is 'transformative.' 7
Transformative use"' is one that is "productive""9 and employs the
111. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A][1][c]. Professor Nimmer
discusses that just because some use is found to be "commercial" does not
preclude the fair use analysis nor precludes the possibility of the finding of fair
use. Id.
112. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (quoting Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818).
The court defined "consumptive use" as one where the "defendant's 'use of the
images merely supersede[s] the object of the originals ... instead [of add[ing]
a further purpose or different character."'). Id.
113. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A] [1] [c] (providing examples
from one extreme, where the "defendant's use of a copyrighted work in an
advertising" campaign will not likely justify a fair use defense, to the other,
where the "defendant's usage constitutes advertising as an extension of its
own work of authorship" is much more likely to fall within the language of the
fair use exception).
114. Id.
115. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981).
116. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(C.C.D.Ma. 1841).
117. See id. (explaining that even though Section 107 does not require
transformative use to qualify for the fair use defense, the purpose of the
copyright law, "is generally furthered by the creation of transformative
works"); see also Matthew D. Bunker, ErodingFair Use: The "Transformative"
Use DoctrineAfter Campbell, 7 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2002) (explaining that
while the transformative requirement is not included enumerated in the four
fair use factors, the first factor has been the "prime site for the infiltration of
the 'transformative use' doctrine").
118. Examples of Transformative Use: Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp.,
973 F. Supp. 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the use of an image in the
background of a film qualifies as transformative); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 407, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002)
(opining that when the value of the work comes principally from some source
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original work in a "different manner or for a different purpose
from the original."'' 0
Thus, "the more transformative the
[secondary use], the less will be the significance of other factors,
like commercialism" in the fair use analysis.12 The rationale is
that without such transformation, the new work would
"supersedeD the.., original."'
On the other hand, when the
transformative secondary use "adds value to the original,"22 it
becomes a new creative work itself and is in line with the purpose
intent of the
of the copyright law and is within the original
4
protection afforded by the fair use doctrine."
For example, in Kelly,"' the Ninth Circuit held that even
though Arriba's use of thumbnails of Kelly's images was
commercial, it weighed "only slightly against a finding of fair
use"12 ' because Arriba had neither used Kelly's images to promote
its search engine nor tried to profit by selling the same. 1 7 Because
Arriba was using Kelly's images for a completely different
purpose. 8 than intended by Kelly, the court reasoned that when a
other than the fame of the celebrity, it may be presumed that sufficient
transformative elements are present); Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1117-19
(finding that website caching by a search engine is transformative and weighs
heavily in favor of a fair use finding following Kelly's analysis).
119. Leval, supra note 41, at 1111. Finding of a "productive use" requires
that the "copier himself is engaged in creating a work of authorship whereby
he adds his own original contribution to that which is copied." NIMMER, supra
note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A] [1][b].
120. Leval, supra note 41, at 1111. Judge Leval explained that because the
word "productive" has the possibility of "encompass[ing] any copying for a
socially useful purpose," the term "transformative" use is more appropriate.
See also NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A][1][b] (citing Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
121. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
122. Id. at 591.
123. Leval, supra note 41, at 1111.
124. Id.
125. 336 F.3d at 811.
126. Id. at 818.
127. Id.
128. Judge Nelson was very instructive in his reasoning for finding
He found that even though Arriba "made exact
transformative use.
replications of Kelly's images, the thumbnails were must smaller, lowerresolution images that served an entirely different function than Kelly's
original images." Id. at 819 (emphasisadded). Kelly's images are artistic and
creative works "used to portray scenes from the American West." Arriba's use
of thumbnails of Kelly's images was "used as a tool to help index and improve
access to images on the Internet and their related web sites." Id. The court
further rejected Kelly's contention that the creation of thumbnails did not add
anything to his copyrighted images and is thus not transformative. Id. Judge
Nelson held that Arriba's conduct was "more than merely a retransmission of
Kelly's images in a different medium." Id. In fact, the court recognized that
Arriba's use of thumbnails serves a different function than Kelly's use and
"promotes the goals of the Copyright Act and the fair use exception" by
enhancing information-gathering techniques on the Internet. Id. at 820. In
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visual search engine, like Arriba, creates and displays thumbnails
of copyrighted images such use is transformative and weighs
heavily in favor of finding fair use.1 2 9
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The purpose of the second fair use factor is to afford different
levels of protection depending on the nature of the copyrighted
work.13 ° The "more creative a work, the more protection" it should
be afforded; the more informational or functional the work, the
more likely it will be that the court will find a valid fair use
defense."' Photographs, the copyrighted works in question here,
which are intended for public viewing for "informative and
purposes," have generally been found to be creative in
aesthetic
132
nature.
Whether the copyrighted work is published or unpublished
has been interpreted as a "critical element of its nature,"'33 given
However, the
the copyright owner's right to first publication.'
fact that the work has not been published is "not necessarily
Due to the
determinative" in negating the fair use defense.'
dicta, the court noted that it "would be unlikely that anyone would use
Arriba's thumbnails for illustrative or aesthetic purposes because enlarging
them sacrifices their clarity," the images did not supersede Kelly's use of the
images, and were transformative. Id. at 819.
129. Id. at 818.
130. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 478 (explaining that the basic idea
behind this factor is the rationale that "to support the public interest there
should be greater access to some kinds of works than others").
131. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A][2][a] (reasoning that this
differentiation results from the recognition that "some works are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than others"). Consideration of the
copyright subject matter point out that the more informational the work, "the
broader should be the scope of the fair use defense." Id.; see also A&M Records
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2001) (opining that creative
works are "closer to the core of intended copyright protection than are more
fact-based works") (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
132. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820; accord Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video,
349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that "photographs taken for
aesthetic purposes, are creative in nature and thus fit squarely within the core
of copyright protection.").
133. See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (opining that secondary uses of "published
works are more likely to qualify as fair use because the first appearance of the
artist's expression has already occurred").
134. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A][2][a] (discussing that
under ordinary circumstances, the exclusive right to first publication granted
to a copyright owner will outweigh a claim of fair use).
135. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 554
(1985). But see Salinger v. Random House, Inc. 650 F. Supp. 413, 417-18
(1986) (interpreting Harper & Row as holding that unpublished works negate
the applicability of the fair use defense); see LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 479
(explaining that these contradictory decisions lead to the amendment of
Section 107 providing that "[tihe fact that a work is unpublished shall not
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conflicting interpretations given to the "nature" of a copyrighted
work, Professor Nimmer has suggested that this factor "more
typically recedes into insignificance in the greater fair use
calculus" 36 and does not weigh heavily for or against a finding of
fair use.
3. Amount and Substantialityof the Portion Used
The third factor focuses on whether the secondary user "has
taken more than is necessary to satisfy" his particular fair use
purpose.13
Any determination under this factor necessarily
requires a "qualitative [and] quantitative" inquiry by the court.'
Although it has been held that verbatim copying does not preclude
a finding of fair use, because all four fair use factors must be
considered before a determination is made,'39 the copying of an
entire work tends to be quantitatively excessive. 4 ° Where the
secondary user only takes as much as is needed for his intended
secondary use, this factor will not weigh against a finding of fair
141
use.

itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all
the above factors." 17 U.S.C. § 107. For example, in Kelly, the Ninth Circuit
found that Kelly's photographs were creative. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
However, the fact that they had "appeared on the Internet before Arriba used
them in its search" was determinative on the fact that Kelly had exercised his
right of first publication. Id. There, the court concluded, in light of additional
considerations, that this factor weight "only slightly" in favor of the copyright
owner. Id.
136. NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A][2][a]; See also Campbell, 510
U.S. at 586 (proposing that the creative nature of a copied work is not
determinative on the negation of the fair use defense).
137. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 480 (analogizing copyright necessity to
the tort self-defense where the effectiveness of the defense will be judged by its
"necessity and proportionality" to the threatened force and stating that
"excessive force abrogates the privilege").
138. LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 481 (citing Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061
(2d Cir. 1977)); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569 (finding that verbatim
copying of only 300 words out of a total of 200,000 words from the copyright
owner's book was excessive because the words in question constituted the
heart of the book). But see NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A] [3]
(discussing that one case held that it was "fair to copy a whole magazine cover
as part of comparative advertising").
139. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 821. The court held that Arriba did in fact create thumbnails of
each of Kelly's images. However, the court found that it "was reasonable to do
so in light of Arriba's use of the thumbnails" in allowing users to better
identify the information that they were seeking. Id. The court pointed out
that copying "necessary for ...[an] intended use" will not negate a fair use
defense. Id.
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4. Effect of the Use upon the PotentialMarket for and Value of the
Copyrighted Work
The final enumerated fair use factor is generally considered
the single most important element in a fair use determination,
but it cannot be used to substitute for any of the other statutory
factors. 43 Courts are required to engage in an analysis considering
not only the "extent of market harm caused by [the secondary
use] ,''14 ' but also "whether [such] unrestricted and widespread
[secondary use] would result in a substantially adverse impact on
the potential market' for the original."' Under this factor, the
copyright owner need only show a "meaningful likelihood of future
harm" to the market occupied by his original work.4 7
Generally, the filling of a "market niche that the copyright
owner

had no

interest in

occupying,"'4 8

or

copying that

is

"complementary to, rather than a substitute for, the copyrighted
work, does not harm the market for the copyrighted work," making
finding of fair use more likely.49 It is also widely accepted that
"the more transformative the new work,' the less likely the new

142. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
143. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A][4] (discussing that this
last factor attempts to strike "a balance "between the benefit the public will
derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will
receive if the use is denied").
144. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 481 (pointing out that "if the market for
the copyright owner's work is harmed, the incentives for creativity that the
copyright monopoly is designed to encourage will not work"). As such, the
ultimate test is whether the secondary use "tends to interfere with [the]
marketability [of the original], or fulfills the demand for the original." Id. at
482.
145. NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A][4]. A potential market is
defined as an immediate or a delayed market, and thus includes harm to
derivative works. Id. Professor Nimmer explains "it is a given in every fair
use case that plaintiff suffers a loss of a potential market if that potential is
defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at bar." Id.
146. NIMMER, supra note 21, at 4-13 § 13.05[A[41; accord Campbell, 510
U.S. at 590; accord Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 568; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821.
147. LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 482. The plaintiff need not show actual
harm, although "quantifiable harm, such as a lost contract, is the best
evidence of harm to the market" of a copyrighted work. Id.
148. Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir.
1993).
149. LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 482.
150. In Kelly, the court found that thumbnails "would not be a substitute for
the full-sized images because the thumbnails lose their clarity when enlarged."
Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821. Judge Nelson explained that if a user wanted to view
Kelly's higher quality images, he would have to visit Kelly's web page. Id.
The court noted that this approach "would hold true whether the thumbnails
are solely in Arriba's database or are more widespread and found in other
search engine databases." Id. In short, the court found that Arriba's use of
thumbnails of Kelly's full-sized images did not supersede the need for the fullsized originals because the thumbnails served an entirely different function
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work's use of copyrighted materials will affect the market" for the
original material.'
IV. SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR DIRECT COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

The express language of the Act of 1976 prohibits only direct
copyright infringement. 52
Nonetheless, the simple absence of
express language providing for secondary liability. 3 does not
preclude courts from imposing liability for copyright infringement
on parties who have not personally engaged in the infringing
activity."4 Generally, liability for contributory infringement occurs
when an individual or entity intentionally induces or encourages
direct infringement by a third party."' One can be found liable for
vicarious infringement by directly profiting from direct
infringement by a third party, while refusing to lawfully stop or
limit the direct infringement."6
The argument for imposing
secondary liability is strongly rooted in the policy that when a
service provider, such as Google, is utilized to commit
infringement, it becomes nearly impossible to enforce vested

than Kelly's original images. Id.
151. Elvis Presley Enters., 349 F.3d at 631. The Supreme Court explained
that a transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the
market of the original than a work that merely supersedes the copyrighted
work. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. The Court concluded that a secondary use
that supersedes the purpose of the original serves as its market replacement,
and will likely cause market harm. Id.
152. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). Section 501(a) of the Act provides that "[alnyone
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by
sections 106 through 122 ... is an infringer of the copyright" and will be
subject to liability under the Act. Conversely, someone who has been given
"permission" to use the work by the copyright owner or who makes a "fair use"
of the work is not an infringer. Id.
153. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 3-12 § 12.04[A] (explaining that unlike
direct liability, secondary liability theories, such as contributory and vicarious
liability, though not explicitly stated in the Act of 1976, are equally applicable
to copyright infringement cases); see also LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 426
(explaining that both contributory and vicarious liability originated in tort law
and "stem[] from the principle that one who directly contributes to another's
infringement should be held accountable").
154. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-35 (comparing the Patent Act to the
Copyright Act). Justice Stevens reasoned that the imposition of secondary
liability on contributory infringers in Section 271 (b) of Title 35 of the Patent
Act, absent any "express language in the copyright statute" to the contrary,
does not preclude courts from imposing secondary liability on parties "who
have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity."
Id.
Because
Congress was given the power to protect patents and copyrights in the same
constitutional clause, and since the "line[] between direct infringement,
contributory infringement and vicarious liability [is] not clearly drawn," courts
are allowed to engage in such comparison. Id. at n.17
155. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 929-30 (2005) [hereinafter Grokster II].
156. Id.
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exclusive rights in the copyrighted work against all direct
infringers effectively.157 The only practical alternative is to "go
against the distributor of the copying device" under secondary
liability
theories,
such
as contributory
and vicarious
infringement.' 8
A. Contributory Liability
Contributory liability evolved from the tort concept of
enterprise liability,' which holds that where one party directly
contributes to a third party's infringement, 160 that party should be
held accountable. A prima facia cause of action for contributory
liability requires a showing of "(1) direct infringement by a
primary infringer, (2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3)
material contribution to the infringement.""' Unlike vicarious
liability, contributory liability does not have a required element of
supervision.'
After direct infringement by a primary infringer is
established, courts must evaluate the knowledge requirement.
Knowledge of third-party infringing use can be satisfied by either
actual or constructive knowledge.'63
However, constructive
knowledge is not presumed where the service, like Google, is
capable of "infringing and substantially noninfringing uses."'64
Under such circumstances, only "actual knowledge of specific acts

157. See id. (noting that prosecuting individual direct infringers would be
impracticable given the great number of infringers, cost of litigation, and that
many are direct infringers are judgment-proof).
158. Id.
159. NIMMER, supra note 21, at 3-12 § 12.04 [A] [3]; see also LEAFFER, supra
note 20, at 426 (discussing that secondary liability for contributory
infringement is derived from Section 106, which "grants the copyright owner
the exclusive right to authorize others to exploit the exclusive rights of
ownership" (emphasis added)). The common law doctrine is applicable under
the copyright law and will result in a finding of joint and several liability
where one "knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act." Id.
160. LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 426.
161. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004)
rev'd on other grounds, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) [hereinafter Grokster 1].
162. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 3-12 § 12.04[A][3] (demonstrating that
an advertising company that places noninfringing advertisements for the sale
of infringing records being sold by a third party may be found secondarily
liable for contributory infringement if it can be shown that the company knew,
or had reason to know of the infringing nature of the records).
163. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 (discussing that to satisfy the knowledge
element, the secondary infringer is required to "know or have reason to know
of direct infringement").
164. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (adopting a modified "staple article of
commerce" doctrine from patent law). The Supreme Court's holding in Sony is
discussed in more detail infra, note 170.
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of infringement" will suffice, 6 ' as long as there is sufficiently clear
and specific notice of the infringing uses.166
The third requirement of material contribution requires that
the secondary infringer engage in "personal conduct that
encourages or assists the infringement."16 7 Merely providing a
means to achieve direct infringement, and even encouraging the
directly infringing activity through advertisement, is not sufficient
to establish contributory liability for copyright infringement. 16
Instead, an online service provider must actively encourage users
to visit infringing web pages or induce/encourage web pages to
content to satisfy the material contribution
serve infringing
169
requirement.
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., the Supreme
Court held that the manufacturer of a product that is "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, " 7' absent evidence of express or
implied intent to promote infringing uses of the product, could not
be held liable as a contributory infringer solely on the basis of its
distribution or knowledge that the product may be put to
infringing use.' 7 ' The Seventh Circuit, in In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation,' applied this holding to online service providers.'

165. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
166. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (explaining that sufficient notice
is intended to give the service provider an opportunity to remedy the
infringing use). Such notice must be complete and specific. Id. Notice that
provides incomplete information, such as truncated URLs, ellipses in URL
address, or listing an entire domain as infringing will not be sufficient to place
the service provider on notice. Id.
167. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
168. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 436 (explaining that it would be a "generalization
that cannot withstand scrutiny" to conclude otherwise).
169. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 856 (reasoning that only directed and
intentional conduct will be sufficient to establish material contribution).
170. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). There, Sony had produced, marketed, and sold the
Betamax video recorder, the predecessor of the VCR. Id. at 419. Universal
City Studios claimed that the device allowed users to record and distribute
copyrighted shows, thus infringing upon its copyrights. Id. at 420. The facts
presented at trial revealed that while Sony was aware that the Betamax was
being used for a wide variety of purposes, including some that were in fact
infringing, predominant use involved a "time-shifting" process - recording a
show now for a viewing later. Id. at 423. The Court reasoned that once Sony
sold the recorder, it lost all control over its use, and that since the product was
not produced for the principle purpose of facilitating copyright infringements,
Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer, even though it was
aware of the infringing uses. Id. at 442.
171. Id. at 442.
172. Id.
173. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003). There, Aimster service was being used to
exchange music and other files using the AOL Instant Messenger for its
communication infrastructure. Id. at 646. Users would download the Aimster
software from Aimster's web site free of charge. Id. Aimster's software, once
installed, connected to the Aimster server, which organized music that
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The court determined that when an online service is capable of
both infringing and noninfringing use, the mere knowledge by the
service provider of such infringing activities is an insufficient basis
to find contributory liability.'
To be liable, the service provider
must engage in affirmative conduct to further the infringing use,
when considered in light of the totality of surrounding
circumstances.'76
Consideration can be given to the active
encouragement of the infringing use, to the failure to take
reasonable measures to prevent infringing use, or to willful
blindness to the fact that the service is being used for infringing
purposes.'77 If the infringing uses are substantial, then to avoid
liability as a contributory infringer, the provider of the service
must demonstrate that it would have been disproportionately
costly for him to eliminate or substantially reduce the infringing
uses by third parties.'
The Supreme Court, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM)
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.,' 9 attempted to settle some
individual users were sharing, provided search capabilities, but did not make
copies of the music itself. Id. The Aimster tutorial provided, as its only
examples, instructions on how to share and download copyrighted music, and
the tutorial itself was found to be "an invitation to infringement." Id. at 651.
A paid service, Club Aimster, enabled members to download the "Top 40"
tracks of popular music with a click of button. Id. at 646. Judge Posner noted
that the fact that Aimster did not maintain the copyrighted files on its servers
distinguished it from Napster and prevented it from being a direct copyright
infringer. Id. at 646-47. The court held that a service must show both that
the service is capable of actual noninfringing uses, and also show that such
uses are probable. Id. at 653. The court found that Aimster failed to show
either actual or probable future noninfringing uses of its service and as such
could not invoke the Sony contributory liability shield. Id.
174. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 429 (stating that the Aimster court
disagreed with Napster's holding that actual knowledge of specific infringing
uses was sufficient to deem a "facilitator a contributory infringer"). Instead
Judge Posner opined that Sony stood for the proposition that once
noninfringing uses were shown by substantial evidence, a cost-benefit analysis
should be applied to determine how burdensome it would be to eliminate or
reduce the infringing uses. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
175. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653.
176. See id. (holding that the evidence produced in discovery showed that
Aimster was created as a "Napster Alternative").
177. See id. at 650 (explaining that "[w]illful blindness is knowledge" in the
copyright law where constructive knowledge of direct infringement may be
enough to find liability). The court found that the would-be infringer does not
obtain immunity "by using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge"
of infringing uses of its service. Id. at 651. Such affirmative conduct to
prevent the acquisition of actual knowledge is the same as the notion of willful
blindness, which is as culpable as positive knowledge. Id.
178. Id. at 653.
179. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). There, MGM, copyright owner, filed a suit for
damages and injunctive relief against defendants, software distributors
Grokster, Ltd. and StreamCast Networks, Inc., alleging that they knowingly
and intentionally distributed their software with the purpose of enabling users
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"disarray" among circuit courts in relation to the application of
contributory liability to online service providers. 80
The Court
referred to its earlier decision in Sony as a means to hold a product
liable only "where an article is 'good for nothing else' but
infringement."1 1 Yet, where a product or service was "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses," 2 intent to induce infringement
was the controlling factor in the determination of liability.183 Thus,
the Court preserved the Sony principle, but rested its decision on
the common law inducement theory rationale of "attempting to
induce infringement."" The Court held that mere knowledge that
a product is capable of, and/or is actually being used to infringe
copyrights, is not enough to find liability. 85 Instead, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the online service provider took active
steps to promote and encourage direct infringement by third

to infringe on copyrights. Id. at 918. Discovery revealed that both defendants
distributed their software free of charge through their web site. Id. Both
defendants were aware that their software was being used primarily to
download copyrighted files, however, as a result of their system structure,
they had no knowledge of which material was being downloaded and when.
Id. The facts showed that the defendants acquired actual knowledge of the
infringing uses of their software through user emails asking for guidance on
how to use the software to infringe copyrights, and that such guidance was
given. Id. at 922-23. When the Supreme Court shut down Napster, Grokster
and StreamCast were actively advertising themselves as the "Napster
Alternative" and the next Napster. Id. at 924. Additionally, neither
defendant made an effort to "filter copyrighted material ... or otherwise
impede the sharing of copyrighted files." Id. at 926. The Court held that the
Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony when it found that the defendants were not
liable as contributory infringers because neither had actual knowledge of the
infringing uses of its product nor materially contribute to the primary
infringements. Id. at 934-35. The Court held that a distributor/manufacturer
that distributes a product with the intent that it be used to infringe
copyrights, as demonstrated by a "clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement," is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
the users of its product. Id. at 919. The Court reasoned that there was
sufficient evidence to find that the defendants expressed their inducing
message to their users, and that the "unlawful objective is unmistakable." Id.
at 940. The Court held that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the defendants due to a preponderance of the evidence for a
contrary decision, and remanded the case for a reconsideration of MGM's
motion for summary judgment. Id.
180. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 429 (explaining that the substantial
differences between the rationale for the Ninth Circuit holding in Napster and
the Seventh Circuit holding in Aimster prompted the Supreme Court to
reconcile the law).
181. GroksterII,545 U.S. at 931-32.
182. Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
183. Id. at 931-34.
184. Id. at 929-30. The court explained that like contributory liability, the
inducement theory requires "evidence of actual infringement by recipients of
the device" or software. Id. at 940.
185. Id.
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parties. 16 A basic example of this is an advertising scheme that
directly aims at promoting an infringing use or instructing third
parties how to engage in an infringing use. Under both the Sony
and Grokster tests, even if actual knowledge by the service
provider is shown, contributory liability will not attach unless the
service provider affirmatively attempted to induce direct
infringement.'87
B.

Vicarious Liability

Vicarious liability for copyright infringement grew out of the
agency doctrine of respondeat superior," but has been held to
89
exceed the "traditional scope of the master-servant theory"
because it does not require the existence of an agency relationship
as a prerequisite for applicability."' Liability under this theory
requires a "(1) direct infringement by a primary party, (2) a direct
financial benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right and ability to
supervise the infringers.""'
Lack of knowledge by the online
service provider that his service is being used for infringing
purposes does not constitute a defense.192
Once direct infringement is proved, direct financial benefit
can be shown where the "availability of infringing material acts as

186. See id. (opining that the evidence must show an affirmative intent that
the product be used to infringe).
187. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 3-12 § 12.04[A][31 (discussing the
dichotomy between product engineering design, on the one hand, and intent of
the manufacturer/distributor as to how the device/service would be used on the
other, Sony and Grokster I respectively). These differing tests may lead to
some individual products or services being held liable under one ruling but not
under the other. Id.; see also Grokster 11, 545 U.S. at 957 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the ruling in Sony "shelters VCRs, typewriters,
tape recorders, photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact disc
burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and
peer-to-peer software[,]" but that it does not shelter "descramblers, even if one
could theoretically use a descrambler in a noninfringing way"). For further
discussion, see LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 429-30.
188. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 3-12 § 12.04[A] [2] (drawing an example
of vicarious liability where the infringer is an employee of a corporation, then
the corporation may be held liable).
189. Id.

190. See LEAFFER, supra note 20, at 432 (explaining that vicarious liability
does not rest on the master-servant doctrine). It is based instead on the "right
or power to control the infringing acts while financially benefiting from them."
Id.
191. Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1164. The court cited to Napster, 239 F.3d at
1036, to explain that vicarious liability requires a "sufficiently supervisory
relationship" to the primary infringer. Id.
192. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 3-12 § 12.04[A][2] (citing a myriad of
cases holding that knowledge of infringing activities is not required when the
defendant has a direct financial benefit and has the right and ability to
supervise the infringers).
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a draw for customers." 193 In fact, it has been suggested that even
absent the receipt of any revenue, a future hope to "monetize"'94 is
sufficient to satisfy this factor. The requirement of the right and
ability to supervise can be presumed when an online service
provider has the exclusive and unilateral ability to block
infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason
Although an agency relationship has been found
whatsoever.9
unnecessary to establish vicarious liability, the Ninth Circuit has
recently stated that where the direct infringers were not acting as
agents of the service provider, the service provider cannot be held
vicariously liable for the conduct of the users."
V. PERFECTING PERFECT10

Perfect 10, Inc. ("P10"), adult web site operator and magazine
publisher,97 filed suit seeking a preliminary injunction against
Google alleging both primary and secondary copyright
infringement.9 P10's claims arose out of Google's use of in-line
linking, framing, and its creation and display of thumbnail copies
of P10's copyrighted full-sized images as a part of Google's Image
193. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. The court cites to Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996), to support the proposition that
direct financial benefit may be shown "where infringing performances enhance
the attractiveness of a venue").
194. See NIMMER, supra note 21, at 3-12 § 12.04[A] [2] (explaining that even
though the express language of the statute states otherwise, "an obvious and
direct financial interest is now understood to encompass a possible, indirect
benefit").
195. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023 (explaining that to escape the imposition
of vicarious liability, a service provider must exercise its "reserved right to
police" to the fullest extent); see also Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 857
(discussing that the complete and absolute ability of a service provider to
remove access to a certain subject matter rendering it completely inaccessible
within the given environment is determinative on the right and ability to
supervise). The nature of the system as a "closed-universe" versus an "open,
web-based service" is conclusive on this aspect of the analysis. Id.
196. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 654.
197. Perfect 10 ("P10") publishes an adult magazine "PERFECT 10" and
operated an adult web site "perfectl0.com" featuring high-quality, nude
photographs of "natural" models. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32.
198. See id. at 832 (noting that P10 has in fact obtained registered
copyrights for its photographs from the United States Copyright Office). P10
argues that Google is a directly infringing its copyrights because it is creating
and displaying thumbnail copies of full-sized copyrighted images located on
Perfect 10's web page. Id. at 837. Additionally, P10 argues that there are
many third party web sites that are also directly infringing its copyrights by
displaying full-sized copies of P10's copyrighted images without express
permission from Perfect 10. Id. However, since many of these web sites and
their operators are judgment-proof, P10 claims that Google should be held
contributorily and vicariously liable for copyright infringement because it
creates and displays thumbnail copies of full-size images located on directly
infringing web sites. Id.
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Search technology." Essentially, the court in Perfect 10 was faced
with four issues: (1) whether Google was displaying images by
using in-line linking and framing; (2) whether creation and display
of thumbnail copies of full-sized images for search purposes
constituted fair use; (3) whether Google could be held liable for
contributory infringement; and (4) whether Google could be held
vicariously liable for the infringing activities of its users.
What makes this case, at first blush, appear distinct from
Kelly,"' which held that the use of thumbnails for search purposes
was fair use, 21 is that shortly before initiating litigation, P10
entered into a licensing agreement with Fonestarz Media
Limited. 22 The agreement provided for the sale and distribution of
reduced-size versions of P10's images for use on cellular phones in
the United Kingdom. 3
This Comment proposes that the language of Kelly and
Section 10724 make it clear that Google's use of thumbnails falls
under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kelly, and is fair and
noninfringing.
In light of the purpose of the copyright law,
existence of a licensing agreement with Fonestarz does not
distinguish Perfect 10 from Kelly and is not a sufficient basis for
departing from well-established precedent.
A. ProperApplication of the "Server"Test to
In-Line Linking and Framing
As a threshold matter, Judge Matz was correct in finding that
Google was not displaying infringing images located on third-party
web pages by using in-line linking and framing. Only the server
where the infringing images are stored should be found, as a
matter of law, to be transmitting and displaying the images for the
purposes of direct copyright infringement.2 0 5 The court properly
199. See supra Parts III & IV for a discussion of both direct and secondary
infringement. The author of this comment contends that the Judge Matz was
correct in his recitation of both primary and secondary liability jurisprudence.
However, the author argues that the court abused its discretion in the
application of primary liability case law.
200. 336 F.3d at 811; see supra Part III for a more in-depth discussion.
201. See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818 (holding that use of thumbnail copies of
copyrighted full-size images was fair use because it was transformative of the
purpose intended of the original work).
202. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (explaining that Fonestarz is a
company based in the United Kingdom that specializes in the sale of cellular
phone accessories, including but not limited to, ring tones, screen savers,
background images, etc.). While there are some questions as to why P10

entered into such agreement, the record points out that it has sold
approximately 6,000 images per month in England since the time of the
licensing agreement. Id.

203. Id.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 107.
205. See supra Part III. A (providing authority on the proposition that
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concluded that the application of the "incorporation" test would
have an adverse effect on the Internet because many, if not most,
web pages that innocently use third-party images would
immediately become direct copyright infringers.2" By applying the
"server" test, Judge Matz properly held that Google's use of in-line
linking and framing does not constitute a "display" of images and
cannot serve as a basis for finding direct liability.
B. Misapplicationof the FairUse Defense to Thumbnails
The district court found that P10 established the likelihood
that Google had directly infringed its copyrights by creating and
displaying thumbnail copies of P10's full-size images.0 8 However,
under the facts of the case, and prior judicial decisions, the court
improperly applied factors one and four in its fair use analysis.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision
in Perfect 10 concerning the application of the fair use defense.0 9
Writing for the court, Judge Ikuta explained that the four
enumerated factors of the fair use defense may not be treated in
isolation. Rather, each element is to be explored, and "the results
weighted together, in light of the purposes of copyright."210
1.

FirstFairUse Factor

In his district court opinion, Judge Matz acknowledged that
the proper determination under the first fair use factor must
involve a two-prong analysis into the commercial and productive
nature of the secondary use.'
Having analyzed the facts on
record, he found that Google's use of thumbnails was highly
transformative but also commercial in nature. 12 However, the
court abused its discretion by apportioning excessive weight to the
commercial nature of Google's secondary use and ignoring the

application of the server test to in-line linking and framing is more logical to

the disbursed nature of the Internet).
206. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing that acceptance
of the "incorporation test" would have a "chilling effect" on the functionality of
the Internet because any web page that pulls or frames information contained
on another server may potentially be found directly liable for copyright
infringement).
207. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 840.

208. Id. at 851. Since this was a motion for preliminary injunctive relief,
P10 was required to show the likelihood of success on the merits. Id.
209. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 710 (9th Cir. 2007)
[hereinafter Perfect 10 11].
210. See id. at 720 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78).
211. See id. at 845 (citing Nimmer, the court agreed that inquiry was
required into whether the use in question was commercial versus
noncommercial and whether it was consumptive versus productive in nature);

Part III.B.1 for additional discussion.
212. Perfect 10,416 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
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highly transformative secondary use of the technology, which
weighs in favor of fair use as a matter of law.
The first prong requires analysis of whether and to what
extent the secondary use is commercial in nature.213 Courts define
commercial use very broadly.214 Commerciality will depend on
whether the accused-infringer's own use, and not the use by third
parties, is commercial. 1 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Kelly
held that when a web site does not use the copyrighted images to
directly promote its own web site nor attempts to profit by selling
the images, its use is more incidental and weighs only slightly
against a finding of fair use. 6
The parties did not dispute that Google utilizes a revenuesharing advertisement program called AdSense.1 7 This program
allows third-party web sites to carry Google-generated advertising
and share in the profits generated per click-through."' Based on
the nature of the program, the court found that Google's AdSense
did not materially contribute to the infringing activities of Google's
users."' At this point, the court improperly shifted its analysis
away from activities of Google, the accused infringer, to those of
third-party web pages. 2
Although it is recognized that Google
makes a profit from AdSense,22' Google itself does not promote its
213. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text (discussing the
definition and examples of commercial use).
215. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (emphasis added).
In Kelly, the court found that the incidental use made of the
216. Id.
copyrighted images was "less exploitative in nature than more traditional
types of commercial use." 336 F.3d at 818.
217. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 846. (discussing that Google splits
advertisement-generated funds with any site that carries Google-generated
advertisements). However, Google is not responsible for the data that is being
served on third party web sites and cannot control what content is displayed
on those web sites. Id. at 855.
218. See id. (explaining that in order to receive click-through credit any user
browsing on a web site must actively click on an advertising banner located on
the third party web page, because only such active click will create a record
and cause profit-sharing to accrue).
219. See id. at 856 (discussing that AdSense could not have contributed to
the infringing uses made by third party web sites because such infringing web
sites potentially existed long before Google created its "Image Search"
technology and would continue to exist even after Google's "Image Search"
would be shut down).
220. Id. at 846.
221. While Google is generally supported by revenue generated from its
advertising/marketing scheme, "Image Search has no advertising." Second
Brief on Cross-Appeal at 16, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 06-55405 (9th
Cir. Jul. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Google's Appellate Brie/I. Google's counsel
explained that while Google did have a "brief test period where Image Search
has advertisements, that practice was discontinued." Id. at 16 n.3. In
addition, the terms and conditions of participation in Google's AdSense
program prohibit the display of "Google ads on web pages with MP3, Video,
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Image Search by using P10's copyrighted images nor does it
attempt to profit by selling the images.222 Thus, the court should
have found, as in Kelly,"' that any financial benefit to Google from
AdSense was merely incidental and weighed only slightly
in favor
4
of PO on the first prong of analysis under this factor.1
Analysis under the second prong asks whether the secondary
use constitutes a new work of creative expression and is
transformative of the original or if it functions as a substitute for
the original in the market."5 A work becomes transformative
when it utilizes the original work in a different manner or for a
different purpose than originally intended.226
Judge Matz recognized that the entertainment use made of
the full-size images by P10 was substantially different from the
Internet location and information use made of the thumbnails by
Google"' Based on this finding, he held that Google's secondary
use was highly transformative of the original purpose intended by
PlO.
However, he also held that Google's use of thumbnail
copies was consumptive of P10's use of similar reduced-size images
for sale to cellular phone users. 29

News Groups, and Image Results." Id. at 18.
222. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 848 (explaining that Google "does not
profit from providing adult content, but from locating, managing, and making
information generally more accessible").
223. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
224. Judge Matz was bound by stare decisis to follow the analysis set forth in
Kelly because the Central District of California is bound by the Ninth Circuit
precedent. See Google's Appellate Brief, infra note 221, at 52 (arguing
persuasively that any differences between Kelly and Perfect 10 are
insubstantial to warrant a departure from well-established, and followed
precedent); see also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d
608 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Kelly to hold that a publisher's secondary use of
reduced-sized images of the copyright owner's posters was fair use).
225. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text (providing examples of
transformative use to support the proposition that when the secondary use is
sufficiently transformative from the originally intended use, it does not
supersede the original copyrighted product).
226. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 849 (citing Kelly, the court found that the substantial differences
between the primary and the secondary use, one for entertainment/aesthetic
purposes and one for indexing and cataloging purposes, rendered the
secondary use highly transformative and weighted heavily in favor of finding
fair use).
229. Id. (opining that users may be able to use the thumbnail copies
generated by Google as background images for their cellular phones without
incurring an expense from purchasing reduced-size images from P10 and
Fonestarz). While arguably thumbnail copies are substantially similar to
reduced-size images, the image quality is inherently different. See id. at 833,
n.4 (defining a thumbnail as a "lower-resolution ... version of a full-size
image").
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Although the court correctly stated the law, it misinterpreted
the holding in Kelly. There, the Ninth Circuit held that when a
secondary use is found to be highly transformative, it weighs
heavily in favor of fair use, even if the use is also commercial in
nature.2" Having found that Google's secondary use was highly
transformative of the original,23 the court should have recognized,
as the Supreme Court did in Campbell, that other factors, like
commerciality of the use, become less important in an analysis
under this factor.23 Additionally, even though Google's use was
commercial, the court should have recognized, as in Kelly,233 that
the highly transformative nature of Google's secondary use
represents a new form of creative expression and cannot be
consumptive of the original.234 These findings weigh heavily in
favor of Google and a finding of fair use.235 Finally, considerations
of the public benefit derived from Google's Image Search and the
speculative and minimal loss of value to P10's full-size images
indicates that the court was clearly
erroneous in finding that this
26
factor weighed in favor of PlO.
In reversing the district court's decision in Perfect 10, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the first fair use factor weighed in
Google's favor 237 because Google's use of thumbnails is highly
transformative and provides an enormous "social benefit by
incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an
electronic reference tool." 238 Such transformative secondary use,

230. See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying test (discussing that a
balance between transformative and commercial use must be established in
any fair use analysis).
231. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
232. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text (explaining that when
the secondary use is sufficiently transformative it "adds value to the original"
and becomes a new form of creative expression, inline with the purpose of the
copyright law).
233. See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (explaining that courts should consider the
public interest, as the basis for the purpose of the copyright law, in
determining if society would be better served by allowing the secondary use as
fair); see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (citing MCA for the
proposition that while fair use and commercial motivation a can exist side by
side, the courts may inquire into the purpose of the secondary use to
determine if it was motivated strictly for the public interest or for selfish,
private commercial gain).
234. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820.
235. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (explaining that a highly
transformative secondary use weights heavily in favor of finding fair use).
236. See Google's Amicus Curiae Brief,supra note 13, at 29 (arguing that the
"mere fact that commercial search engines turn a profit should not 'trump'...
the enormous public benefit they provide" (internal citation omitted)).
237. Perfect 10 11, 487 F.3d at 723.
238. See id. at 721 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 556-57; Sony, 464 U.S. at 431-32).
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"particularly in light of its public benefit, outweighs Google's
superseding and commercial uses of the thumbnails.""9
2. FourthFair Use Factor
Judge Matz announced that the fourth fair use factor requires
an inquiry into the extent of market harm and whether continued
secondary use would have an adverse impact on the market of the
original.140 The copyright owner does not have to show actual
market harm, 41 just a meaningful likelihood of future market
harm. 42 More importantly, Judge Matz recognized that the more
transformative the secondary use, the less likely it would harm the
market of the original. 4'
He also recognized that when a
secondary use fills a market niche that the copyright owner never
intended to occupy, 44 there can be no substantial adverse market
impact.24 Having properly recognized relevant jurisprudence, the
court abused its discretion in finding that Google's secondary use
of thumbnail copies of P10's full-size images had an adverse effect
on P10's market.
The facts of the case led the court to note that there was a
remote possibility that P10's market for the sale of reduced-size
239. Id. at 723.
240. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (citing Kelly for the position that
the double inquiry required under this factor is intended to ensure that the
current and any future market impact would be considered by the court in its
determination); see also supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text
(discussing that when a potential market is adversely impacted, the financial
encouragement of the copyright act may lose its affectivity and may interfere
with future artistic expression and development).
241. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining that market
injury can be both current and future-oriented, and as such requires an
inquiry into both the current and future markets that the copyright owner
may wish to enter).
242. Id.
243. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (expressing that the
Supreme Court decision in Campbell is controlling and further suggesting that
when secondary use is highly transformative of the original work, the relevant
jurisprudence compels the courts to find that such secondary use is fair within
the language of the copyright law and also furthers the purpose of the same).
244. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (citing Twin Peaks to
express that when an accused-infringer produces items for a neglected market
segment, fair use may reasonably be found as long as the other three
enumerated fair use factors are sufficiently satisfied toward a finding of fair
use).
245. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (espousing that when the
secondary use is complementary, rather than substitutive, adverse impact to
the market of the original work is greatly reduced and weights in favor of
finding fair use). When, as in Perfect 10, the secondary use is in a different
market and does not interfere with any established markets enjoyed by the
original work, any adverse market impact is merely incidental and does not
weigh heavily against a fair use defense. See supra notes 144-151 and
accompanying text.
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images for use on cellular phones may be adversely affected
because users may be less likely to buy images from P10 and
Fonestarz if they could potentially get them for free through
Google.246 However, and more importantly, the court found that
Google's secondary use was highly transformative because it was
intended for information gathering and search delivery. 4 ' The
court further identified that Google's use of thumbnails filled a
market niche that P10 never intended to occupy because its
business is focused on aesthetic and creative delivery of adult
content.48
Although it is possible that a user of Google's Image Search
could go through the long and difficult process of transferring
Google's thumbnail to a cellular phone,"' such use is highly
speculative."' The reviewing court must first limit its market
impact analysis to the American cellular phone market.251 If the
court had done so, it would have found that Google's use does not
interfere with P10's U.S. cellular phone market because U.S.
cellular phone carriers are committed to providing only "PG-rated"
enhancements on their networks.252
Second, the court must
determine whether such use is likely to occur.5
This inquiry

246. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 851 (assuming, without factual
support, that the cellular phone market for reduced-size images may have
grown faster if Google was not creating and displaying thumbnail copies of
P10's copyrighted images).
247. Id. at 849.
248. Id.
249. See infra note 253 and the cited reference for more details (explaining
that the user would have to copy the thumbnail to a personal computer in the
form of an image, adjust the resolution of the new image so that it would
properly fit a cellular phone screen without any distortions, transfer the image
to the cellular phone, and go through the process of set it as a background).
250. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
251. See Google's Appellate Brief, supra note 221, at 60 (arguing that when
analyzing market impact, courts must limit their considerations to the
American market and not a "worldwide" market).
252. See id. at 60 n.17 (citing PlO's exhibit ERG299, Google's counsel showed
that American market impact is "limited by other factors" primarily by the
reluctance of U.S. cellular phone carriers "to allow adult content" and their
current commitment to "serve up PG-rated fare").
253. At least one commentator has suggested that determination of market
impact requires an inquiry into the ease with which a certain impact can be
brought about. Britton Payne, Imperfect 10: Digital Advances and Market
Impact in Fair Use Analysis, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
279 (2006).
The author proposes that even though thumbnail images can be moved
to cellular phones, courts need to inquire into how practicable it would be for
the average cellular phone user to move suspect thumbnail images from the
Internet, to the computer, to the cellular phone. Id. at 289. He explains that
the process requires a specialized software package to initiate communication
between the computer and the cellular phone. Id. at 289-90. The author also
points out that the average thumbnail dimensions are 320 x 240 pixels, while
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would have shown that even though such use was possible, it was
highly unlikely given its highly technical nature.254
These considerations aside, the district court found Google's
secondary use to be highly transformative.. and to occupy a
market niche that P10 never intended to address. 56 This, in itself,
should have led Judge Matz to hold, as in Kelly,"' that Google's
use does not supersede P10's full-size images in either the full-size
or reduced-size image market. By finding that this factor weighed
in P10's favor, the court was clearly erroneous as to its application
of relevant jurisprudence.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the fourth fair use
factor favored neither party."8 The court held that the district
court erred when it found that Google's secondary use had an
adverse impact on P10's cellular phone market for selling reducedsized images. 5 ' Despite reasoning that users of Google could
obtain and use thumbnails free of charge, the district court did not
make a finding that Google's users had in fact downloaded
thumbnail images for cellular phone use."' Any such "potential
harm" to P10's market remained hypothetical in nature. 6'
3. Considerationsof Social Policy and the Purpose of the
Copyright Law
Before coming to any final conclusion regarding fair use, a
court must consider the public policy and purpose underlying the
Copyright Act. 2 There have been several suggestions that courts
should adopt public policy concerns as a fifth relevant fair use
factor, and not simply as a secondary consideration.62 This would
the highest available cellular phone display is 240 x 240 pixels. Id. at 291.
This means that the image would have to be reformatted to fit the cellular
phone screen and would inevitably loose quality in the process - the
determinative issue in Kelly. Id. at 291-92.
254. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
255. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
256. Id.
257. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Perfect 10 11, 487 F.3d at 723.
Id.
Id. at 724.
Id.
See supra notes 105-106 (opining that the furtherance of creative

development is the driving force behind the copyright law and that financial
compensation to the author is a secondary consideration). The very purpose of
the copyright law is enumerated in the Constitution as a means "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts," U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. The
furtherance of such a purpose is the driving force behind the copyright law.
263. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text (explaining that fair
use should be found where the progress of science and technology reasonably
requires such use to be allowed, rather than restricted); see also supra notes
47-51 and accompanying text (noting that since the four enumerated fair use
factors are suggestive and nonexclusive, such expansion would not contravene
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allow courts to apply the fair use exception in situations where
analysis under the four itemized fair use factors yields a
borderline result." With additional latitude, courts could find fair
use where it would be required by policy and equity.26
Equitable considerations in line with the policy of the
copyright law, 66 in turn, would allow courts to find that
information locating, delivering, and standardizing tools, such as
Google, favor a finding of fair use because the informationretrieval purpose would be substantially different from the
creative or aesthetic purpose intended of the original.6 7 Such a
finding should solidify the fair use analysis in favor of Google. The
secondary use of thumbnails for search purposes is consistent with
the purpose of the copyright law, and thus fair and noninfringing.
This analysis was in fact undertaken by the Ninth Circuit.
After having analyzed each enumerated fair use factor
individually, the court weighed all of the factors together "in light
of the purposes of copyright."2" In balancing Google's highly
transformative use of thumbnails against the "unproven use" of
Google's thumbnails for cellular phone downloads, in light of the
other fair use factors and the purpose of copyright, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Google's use of P10's thumbnails was fair
use. 269 As such, the court vacated the preliminary injunction
against Google.270
The decision of the Ninth Circuit has been heralded as a "big
win for fair use."27' By upholding the underlying social policies of
fair use and freedom on the Internet, the court declined to put
copyright owners "completely in charge of how and when search
engines" could use freely available content on the Internet. 79
Moreover, it gives search engines "the ability to take advantage of
computer technology in search for and use of information."272

the language of Section 107).
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text (discussing that the
fair use exception is equitable in nature and allows courts to avoid unjust
results from a strict application of the copyright law and sometimes
unworkable fair use factors).
266. See supra Parts L.A & I.B for further discussion.
267. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
268. Perfect 10 11, 487 F.3d at 725.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Erik Schmidt, Three Views of the Perfect 10 v. Google Decision, TECH
LAwFORUM, Santa Clara University, School of Law, May 24, 2007,

http://www.techlawforum.netinternet-policy/net-law/perfect-10-v-google
views/.
272. Id. (citing Jason Schultz, EFF).
273. Alan Sipress, Google Wins Appeal on Copyright of Nude Images, WASH.
POST, May 17, 2007, at D01.
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C. ProperApplication of Secondary Liability Jurisprudence
To have found Google contributorily liable for direct
infringement by its users, P10 had to establish that Google had
actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement by its users and
that it materially contributed or induced its users to infringe.274 It
is not sufficient to show that Google provided the means for
infringement; rather, an actual and affirmative intent to induce
infringement must be shown.27
As to the first prong, Judge Matz assumed that Google had
sufficient notice276 of infringing activities by its users. 2" However,
the court found that Google did not materially contribute to these
activities. 278 The court reasoned that web sites serving infringing
content existed long before Google's Image Search came into
existence and would likely continue to exist long after. 9 Under
the facts of the case, Judge Matz properly concluded that Google
could not be held liable for contributory infringement.2 0
274. See supra notes 159-162 and accompanying text (explaining the
elements of a prima facia case); see also supra notes 163-169 and
accompanying text (extrapolating on the elements of a claim for contributory
infringement and discussing relevant jurisprudence).
275. See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text (discussing that actual
affirmative intent to cause direct infringement by a third-party is required);
see also supra notes 170-187 and accompanying text (discussing relevant
jurisprudence involving the common law inducement theory and analyzing the
similarities and differences between intent and inducement for contributory
liability).
276. See Google's Appellate Brief,supra note 221, at 21 (questioning whether
P10 provided sufficient notice to Google). Google argued that the notice
provided by P10 were "vastly overbroad, dealing often with unrelated third
parties and non-copyright issues ... [and] they were incomplete ...

in light of

the DMCA's notice requirements set forth in § 512(c)(3). Id. Google's counsel
also made an argument for collateral estoppel by pointing out that a previous
court has held that P10's "similar notices [of copyright infringement] to be
defective." Id. (citing Perfect 10 v. CCBill, LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1096-97
(C.D. Cal. 2004)).
277. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (opining that since P10 has failed
to carry its burden to show material contribution by Google to the infringing
activities of third-party users, the court is not required to make conclusive
findings as to actual knowledge of infringing activities). The court chose to
presume actual knowledge because the evidence presented by both P10 and
Google was inconsistent on some material considerations. Id. For instance,
P10 alleged, through Dr. Zada, that it began sending Google notices of direct
copyright infringement as early as May 2001. Id. at 854. However, Google
claimed that such notice was not sufficiently definite such as to allow it to take
preventive actions. Id.
278. Id. at 856.
279. See id. (opining that even though Google may have arguably provided
the means for displaying or potentially enhancing third-party directly
infringing activities, providing the means without active inducement or
encouragement is not enough to satisfy a finding of contributory
infringement).
280. Id.
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As to vicarious liability, the court determined that P10 must
sufficiently show that Google received a direct financial benefit
from the infringing activities of its users and had the right and
ability to supervise the users' activities.281 Judge Matz found that
Google received a direct financial benefit from directly infringing
activities of its users as a result of its AdSense program. 82
However, the court concluded that Google did not have the ability
to supervise user activity because it did not have the ability to
unilaterally prevent access to infringing materials. 2' As a result,
Judge Matz was correct in finding that Google could not be held
vicariously liable for infringing activities of its users.2 84
VI. CONCLUSION

The undisputed purpose of the copyright law is to encourage
the development of creative expressions by granting a limited
monopoly to the author of an original work. 2" The creative
progress may be inhibited if a secondary work serves as a
substitute for the original without itself being a new form of
creative expression. 288 Because the purpose of the copyright law is
to promote progress, Congress provided the fair use defense, 287
which allows the court to avoid the strict application of liability
under the copyright law by finding some secondary uses that may
otherwise
be infringing to be fair and noninfringing as a matter of
88
2

law.

When Google creates and displays thumbnail copies of fullsized copyrighted images, regardless of whether the original
281. Id.; see also supra note 191 and accompanying text (stating the
elements for a prima facia case of vicarious liability).
282. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (discussing that direct financial
benefit can be found where there is even a "future hope to monetize"); see also
supra notes 193-194 and accompanying text (citing relevant case law to
explain the meaning and requirements for a finding of direct financial benefit).
283. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 857 (opining that Google does not
have the ability to supervise the content that it serves to users because by
removing access to the information from Google's database does not render the
information completely inaccessible); see also supra notes 195-196 (explaining
the requirements for finding supervisory ability on the part of an alleged
secondary infringer); Google's Appellate Brief, supra note 221, at 19 (pointing
out that since web publishers participating in AdSense are posting
pornographic images contrary to Google's AdSense "terms and conditions" is
additional proof that Google lacks the power to control third-party infringing
conduct).
284. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 858.
285. See supra Part L.A (discussing the development and purpose of the
modem copyright act).
286. Id.
287. See supra Part I.B (explaining the basis for the development of the fair
use defense); see also supra Part III.B (applying the fair use defense to
Google's use of thumbnail copies of P10's full-sized copyrighted images).
288. Id.
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images are located on third-party infringing web pages or on the
copyright owner's web page, it is using the thumbnail copies for a
completely different purpose - creative and aesthetic versus
information gathering and organizing, respectively - as was
originally intended by the copyright owner. Additionally, when
the secondary use is highly transformative, as is the case with
Google, it falls squarely within the language of the fair use
exception, and is in accordance with the purpose of the copyright
law.
Recognition that Internet search engines like Google provide
an immense public benefit, including exposure to many resources
that may otherwise not be easily accessible, must lead to the
conclusion that limiting the functionality of search engines would
have a disastrous effect on the utility of the Internet.289 In effect,
all search engines, news aggregators and individual bloggers, who
innocently post thumbnails on their sites,29° would become direct
copyright infringers subject to the full range of penalties under the
Act of 1976. Therefore, the finding that Google's use of thumbnails
is fair and noninfringing furthers the ability of Internet service
providers to develop new and creative means to deliver and
organize information while preserving complete copyright
protection of the enumerated rights held by copyright owners.

289. Telephone Interview with Peter J. Pizzi, Partner, Connell Foley, LLP,

in Northbrook, I1.(Aug. 25, 2006).
290. Jeannine Guttman, How We Got Into A Blog Jam, ME SUNDAY
TELEGRAM, July 23, 2006, at C1 (discussing how a recent study has found that
approximately "12 million American adults, or 8 percent of all Internet users"
have and keep a blog).

